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MISSING SEX TALK IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASES 
                              (forthcoming UMKC L. Rev. 2016) 
 
Two kinds of sex talk are noticeably absent from the Supreme Court’s same-sex 
marriage opinions: there is very little discussion either of the joy of sex or of the 
constitutionally mandated prohibition of discrimination in law on grounds of sex.  
This essay reflects on some of the troubling reasons for and implications of the 
absence of such sex talk. 
 
Mary Anne Case* 
 
I have been worrying for more than two decades about what a U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion recognizing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to 
marry might say.1  My worry was less about the bottom-line result—after all, as 
even Justice Scalia has long conceded,2 few legal conclusions have been as 
inescapable as the conclusion that our current constitutional case law, applied in 
routine fashion, mandates a victory for the plaintiffs in the same sex-marriage 
cases3 Obergefell v. Hodges4 and United States v. Windsor.5  As discussed below, 
any competent lawyer who connected the dots in Supreme Court case law could 
find half a dozen solid doctrinal routes to same-sex marriage and few, if any, 
potential roadblocks.6   
                                                                                                                                    
 
* Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, and Fernand Braudel 
Fellow, European University Institute.  I am particularly grateful for the extraordinarily generous 
editorial help of Nancy Levit, thoughtful comments from Susan Frelich Appleton, bibliographic 
advice from Will Baude and Richard Bernstein, and support from the Kanter Fund. 
1 See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns:” Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1486-90 (2000) 
[hereinafter Case, The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns]. 
2 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that 
“state laws against . . . same-sex marriage” were no longer “sustainable” once the Lawrence 
majority undercut “Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices” while making “no effort to 
cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using strikeouts and substitutions to edit the Defense of 
Marriage Act decision so as to apply to a challenge to state bans on same-sex marriage). 
3 Conservatives, including the Supreme Court dissenters in these cases, are a little like Obama 
birthers or Benghazi conspiracy theorists—they are centering on decisions which have strong 
anchors in existing settled doctrine and treating them as lawless, against a background of their 
acceptance of many decisions, favoring both the left and the right, that are much more readily 
contestable. 
4 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
5 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
6 I identified one such potential roadblock to a substantive due process holding in favor of same-sex 
marriage in my analysis in Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 S. 
CT. REV. 75, 139 (2004) [hereinafter Case, Of This and That]: 
After Lawrence, every constitutionally recognized aspect of liberty legal 
marriage formerly monopolized (sex, reproduction, parenting, etc.) seems, as a 
matter of constitutional right, no longer within the state’s or marriage’s 
monopoly control.  To the extent that the so-called fundamental right to marry 
is, as is customary for fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution, a 
negative liberty which establishes only a limit on state interference, Lawrence, 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2740040 




I was instead concerned that, in the language it chose to recognize 
same-sex marriage, the Court, like certain state courts before it, might 
unnecessarily do serious collateral damage to other rights I value.  My greatest 
concern, set forth at length in my 2010 piece What Feminists Have to Lose in 
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation,7 was that, were the Court to hold, as some state 
courts had done, that bans on same-sex marriage simply did not discriminate on 
the basis of sex, it would jeopardize “the entire body of U.S. Supreme Court sex 
discrimination law of the last forty years”8 which centered on the propositions 
that the right to equal protection on grounds of sex was an individual right and 
that this right was violated by laws entrenching or relying on “fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females,”9 including their roles 
and abilities in marriage.  More generally, I worried about the harm even a 
favorable opinion from the Court could do to a variety of liberation projects I was 
committed to, and I could only hope that the Court would “above all do no 
harm”10 to the broader project of “preserv[ing] and extend[ing] the liberty and 
equality of all regardless of sex or orientation.”11 
Like many other readers of and commentators on Justice Kennedy’s 
opinions in the same-sex marriage cases,12 I did think that the excessive emphasis 
on the dignity and nobility of marriage harmed the liberty and equality of those 
who do not marry, putting me in unusual agreement with Justice Clarence 
Thomas, whose footnote on the subject13 was that portion of the Obergefell 
opinions that had my most whole-hearted assent.14  
                                                                                                                                    
at least as an analytical matter, may spell less the beginning than the end for 
same-sex couples of any claimed right of access to state-sponsored marriage 
rooted in substantive due process, rather than squarely in equal protection. 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Obergefell centers on this particular roadblock, insisting that “liberty 
has long been understood as individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a 
particular governmental entitlement.”  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original).  Whatever purchase this objection may have with respect to Jim 
Obergefell’s claim to have his spouse’s name included on an official government death certificate, 
it has much less with respect to the DeBoer plaintiffs’ claim in Obergefell not to have Michigan 
take children being raised by both of them away from the survivor should her spouse happen to die 
or to Edith Windsor’s claim not to be put at risk of losing her marital home to estate taxes on the 
death of her spouse.  What Edith Windsor and April DeBoer sought in their lawsuits can indeed, 
Justice Thomas to the contrary notwithstanding, plausibly be characterized as “freedom from 
governmental action.” 
7 See generally Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1199 (2010) [hereinafter Case, What Feminists Have to Lose]. 
8 Id. at 1219. 
9 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
10 From the Latin maxim “primum non nocere” associated with the physician’s Hippocratic Oath.  
11 Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 7, at 1233. 
12 See, e.g., Michael Cobb, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-lonely-hearts-club.html 
(“Founding your dignity on something as flimsy and volatile as a sexual connection insures 
dignity’s precariousness as it enshrines your inherent unworthiness as a single individual.”). 
13 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at n.8 (Thomas, J., dissenting): 
The majority also suggests that marriage confers ‘nobility’ on individuals. . . . I 
am unsure what that means.  People may choose to marry or not to marry.  The 




In my essay for this symposium, however, I shall be focusing on the 
implications of what was missing from the opinions in Obergefell and Windsor; 
in particular, on what might follow from the comparative absence of two 
different kinds of sex talk—one concerned with discrimination on grounds of sex 
and the other concerned with sexuality and sexual expression.15 
Despite tantalizing hints at oral arguments in both Hollingsworth v. 
Perry and Obergefell that the issue of sex discrimination in bans on same-sex 
marriage was on their minds,16 the members of the Court barely discussed sex 
discrimination in any of their opinions in a same-sex marriage case, thus 
relieving me of my worst fears.  I am not yet ready to relax and let down my 
guard, however.  In the second part of this essay, I shall explain the dangerous 
implications I see in the very silence of the Justices on the subject of sex 
discrimination in the same-sex marriage cases, especially given the public 
declarations and voting records of Justice Kennedy and the four Obergefell 
dissenters with respect to other cases of constitutional sex discrimination.    
Before turning to these concerns, let me first comment on the absence of 
another kind of sex talk from the Court’s consideration of same-sex marriage: 
                                                                                                                                    
decision to do so does not make one person more ‘noble’ than another.  And the 
suggestion that Americans who choose not to marry are inferior to those who 
decide to enter such relationships is specious.   
My agreement with Thomas follows from my previously discussed agreement with Justice Denise 
Johnson of Vermont, who wrote in that state’s same-sex marriage decision, Baker v. State, 744 
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) that “[i]n granting a marriage license, the State is not espousing certain morals, 
lifestyles, or relationships, but only identifying those persons entitled to the benefits of the marital 
status.”  Id. at 898-99 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).  For further discussion see Mary 
Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1781 (2005). 
14 I shall be discussing this in a forthcoming piece on Dignities in Windsor and Beyond 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
15 In addition to building on my prior work as discussed in the text, I am also referencing in my title 
Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action?  Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2005) (focusing on the absence of what she calls “gender 
talk” in the public debates on same-sex marriage). 
16 In the oral argument in Perry, Justice Kennedy asked the lawyer defending Proposition 8, “[d]o 
you believe this can be treated as a gender-based classification? . . . It’s a difficult question that I’ve 
been trying to wrestle with.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).  And Chief Justice Roberts asked counsel in Obergefell, “if Sue loves 
Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can’t.  And the difference is based upon their 
different sex.  Why isn’t that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?”  Transcript of 
Oral Argument pt.1 at 62, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556).  I had been 
hopeful that the Chief Justice would give Obergefell his vote on this basis.  See Liz Goodwin, 
Justice Roberts Revives an Old Argument that Could Save Gay Marriage, YAHOO NEWS (Apr. 28, 
2015), https://www.yahoo.com/politics/justice-roberts-revives-an-old-argument-that-could-
117640176486.html.  In this article, I describe to a reporter the advantages for Chief Justice 
Roberts in holding that bans on same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of sex, recapitulating 
arguments I made earlier in Case, The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns, supra note 1, at 1489.  
In that earlier piece, I argued that “to strike down a ban on same-sex marriage on equal protection 
grounds as violative of norms against sex discrimination rather than on substantive due process 
grounds as violative of guarantees of associational privacy and family autonomy, is in many 
respects the more conservative, more easily limited decision,” because, inter alia, it would not open 
the door to claims for the recognition of polygamous and incestuous marriages.  Id.  




Although the letters “sex” appear literally hundreds of times in the Obergefell 
opinions, they almost always do so as part of the hyphenated constructs 
“same-sex” or “opposite-sex.”  Of sex in the sense of sexual activity there is little 
discussion, although it would for several reasons be relevant.  Among these 
reasons is that the line of substantive due process cases vindicating “intimate 
choices”17 culminating in Obergefell has its roots in Griswold v. Connecticut, a 
case concerning the policing of sexual activity in the “sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms.”18  In 2015, the year of Griswold’s fiftieth anniversary, the two 
themes that case brought together, marriage and contracepted sex, have been 
pulled apart into the sacred and settled on the one hand and the profane and 
contested on the other, with a renewed establishment of marriage in Obergefell 
and a renewed precarization of access to contraception in Hobby Lobby and its 
progeny.19  Kennedy in Obergefell cites Griswold’s famous definition of 
marriage as  
“a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to 
the degree of being sacred.”20  But, in his Hobby Lobby concurrence, Kennedy 
applies the language of “dignity” and “self-definition,” central to his view of 
marriage in Obergefell, not to female employees seeking contraception, but only 
to their employers who “deem it necessary to exercise their religious beliefs 
within the context of their own closely held, for-profit corporations.”21  
Religiously inflected for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby seem now to have 
joined marriages in the ranks of “association[s] for as noble a purpose as any 
involved in our prior decisions;”22 their approach to sex has now taken center 
stage. 
Even in discussing the evolving history of marriage, the Obergefell 
majority makes no mention of marriage’s prior role as holding a monopoly over 
lawful sex, notwithstanding that this monopoly was what grounded the 
constitutional right to marry for prior courts.23  Instead it declares that marriage 
                                                                                                                                    
 
17 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2957. 
18 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) 
19 Given that the purpose of the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to 
ensure easier and greater access to contraception to large numbers of women, it may seem odd to 
speak of a new precarity in access to contraception, but it should be noted that before advocates for 
religious exemption focused their attention on the intersection of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the ACA, Hobby Lobby itself was providing its employees the 
contraceptive insurance it now objects to, as were a number of religious employers now 
challenging the mandate’s application to them. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Why 
“Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious 
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 U.S.C. L. REV. 463, 464 n.3 (2015). 
20 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486). 
21 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  As for the 
interests of the female employees, Kennedy mentions only their “health” given the “many medical 
conditions for which pregnancy is contraindicated.”  Id. 
22 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, 2600 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486). 
23 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  




“fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection” (quoting the 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage case, Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health),24 “expression, intimacy, and spirituality” (citing Windsor), “love, 
fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family,” “companionship and understanding and 
assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”25  
 
I.  MISSING TALK OF SEXUALITY 
 
The following sentences perhaps best encapsulate the absence of talk of 
sexuality from Justice Kennedy’s opinions in the same-sex marriage cases: “Like 
choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and 
childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning 
marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.26 
                                                                                                                                    
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers must 
be used and the legal and social context in which children are born and brought 
up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication, and homosexual practices 
which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful 
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into our social life that any 
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build on that basis.  
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (“[I]f appellee’s right to procreate means anything at 
all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows 
sexual relations legally to take place.”).  Instead of quoting from the passages in Zablocki centering 
on sex, Kennedy chooses those highlighting family formation, quoting that portion of the opinion 
holding “it would be contradictory ‘to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of 
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the 
family in our society.’” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386). 
24 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003). 
25 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.  As will be discussed further below, a similarly sex-free 
articulation of the issues can be found in Justice Kennedy’s preliminary summation of  
the petitioners’ stories [which] make clear the urgency of the issue they present 
to the Court: James Obergefell now asks whether Ohio can erase his marriage 
to John Arthur for all time.  April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse now ask whether 
Michigan may continue to deny them the certainty and stability all mothers 
desire to protect their children, and for them and their children the childhood 
years will pass all too soon.  Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura now ask whether 
Tennessee can deny to one who has served this Nation the basic dignity of 
recognizing his New York marriage.   
Id. at 2606. 
26 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.  The quoted language is from a 
section of the opinion in which Kennedy traces the importance of marriage first to the individual, 
next to the couple, then to the family, and finally to “the social order.”  In my 1993 article, Mary 
Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of 
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (1993), I similarly identified the 
individual, the couple and the community as central foci of gay life and rights, but observed that the 
development of the Supreme Court case law of intimate association began with the community 
(somewhat broader than the family) in cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(protecting an interest in educating children in foreign languages), continued to the couple, when 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) protected their right to use contraceptives and finally 
reached the individual when Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) extended access to 
contraceptives to individuals.  




Here, even though the citation is to Lawrence v. Texas, a case 
exclusively about sexual activity, without any connection to procreation, family, 
marriage, or childrearing,27 there is no mention of the particular intimate 
constitutionally-protected choice of whether and with whom to have sex.28  As I 
and others have observed, even thinking, let alone talking, about sex seems to 
make judges like Justice Kennedy uncomfortable.29 
When, in 1993, I first wrote about the legal history of litigating for 
lesbian and gay rights, I noted that up to that point, “courts [had] accord[ed] the 
most favorable treatment to those gay men and lesbians involved in close, 
long-term relationships from which the sexual aspect ha[d] perforce been 
removed due to the death, illness, or imprisonment of one of the members of the 
couple,”30 perhaps because courts could then “focus on all the wonderful pair 
bonding without being threatened by the sexual implications of that pair 
bonding.”31  It is worth highlighting that the named plaintiffs in the same-sex 
marriage cases recently before the U.S. Supreme Court fit this pattern: that Edie 
Windsor was a widow and Jim Obergefell a widower was central to the claims 
                                                                                                                                    
 
27 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), the case Lawrence overruled (upholding 
criminalization of private consensual adult homosexual sodomy because “[n]o connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated”). 
28 Cf. id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 
63 (1973)): 
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is a 
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, 
community welfare, and the development of human personality. . . . The fact 
that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate 
sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that 
there may be many “right” ways of conducting those relationships, and that 
much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an 
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. 
Although Kennedy does acknowledge in Obergefell, that “Lawrence invalidated laws that made 
same-sex intimacy a criminal act,” he again, as in Lawrence, makes of intimate association 
something almost necessarily broader than sexual activity, saying again that “[w]hen sexuality 
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element 
in a personal bond that is more enduring.”  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (quoting Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 567). 
29 See, e.g., Case, Of This and That, supra note 6, at 77.  Interpreting Obergefell similarly, Nan 
Hunter has suggested: 
Perhaps one reason for the overblown language of the opinion is an impulse to 
deflect attention from the historical association of marriage not only with 
commitment and children, but also with sexuality.  The words “dignity” and 
“sexuality” do not usually appear in the same sentence.  Consciously or not, the 
Court uses the language of dignity in ways that occlude the physical intimacy 
dimensions of what is at stake, even though, until relatively recently, marriage 
was the only social location in which sexual activity was lawful. 
 Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage, 6 CAL. L. REV. 
CIRCUIT 107, 110 (2015).   
30 Case, supra note 26, at 1644.  
31 Id. at 1660. 




each pressed before the court; Windsor was seeking the marital exemption from 
estate taxes and Obergefell to “be listed as the surviving spouse on [his spouse’s] 
death certificate.”32 
Even when one goes beyond these two named plaintiffs, there is a 
striking emphasis in the same-sex marriage cases recently drawn to the Supreme 
Court’s attention on the spouses’ desire to be recognized as unified, not so much 
in life and in bed as in death.  Thus, in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,33 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) test case carefully prepared by Gay & 
Lesbian Advocates & Defenders’ Mary Bonauto, who argued Obergefell, one of 
the lead plaintiffs was the widower of a Congressman suing for recognition for 
death benefits.34  Similarly, in the companion case brought by the state of 
Massachusetts, a principal alleged harm to the state’s interests from the 
enforcement of DOMA was that “burying a veteran with his or her same-sex 
spouse removes federal ‘veterans’ cemetery’ status and gives the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs discretion to recapture all federal funding for the cemetery” 
from the state.35  Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s first point to the court in 
Windsor, (the only point he got to make before being barraged with questions) 
was that DOMA “means that the spouse of a soldier killed in the line of duty 
cannot receive the dignity and solace of an official notification of next of kin.”36 
Moreover, both Thea Speyer, Edie Windsor’s spouse,37 and John Arthur, 
Jim Obergefell’s husband, did not die suddenly, but each after a long, debilitating 
illness in which they were faithfully tended by their respective spouses, who each 
exemplified the wedding vows a couple makes to take one another “for better for 
worse, . . . in sickness and in health, until death us do part.”  In both cases, the 
legally cognizable exchange of those wedding vows was made, after decades of 
the couple’s living their fulfillment, in what amounted to a tarmac wedding,38 
                                                                                                                                    
 
32 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
33 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (2010).  A cert petition in these two Massachusetts cases was before the 
Supreme Court at the same time as Windsor’s, but was passed over in favor of Windsor’s, most 
likely because Elena Kagan, who as Solicitor General had participated in them, would have had to 
recuse herself, potentially leading to a deadlock. 
34 Massachusetts v. United States HHS, 682 F.3d 1 (2012). 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 Transcript of Oral Argument at 80, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2015).  
37 Windsor insisted one should never call Speyer, the butch to Windsor’s femme, her wife.  See 
Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife: How Edith Windsor Fell in Love, Got Married, and Won a Landmark 
Case for Gay Marriage, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife (“’Every time somebody calls 
her my wife, I am furious,’” Windsor said. . . . ‘[Y]ou can say she’s my spouse.  Or you can say 
nothing.  But you cannot say she’s my wife.  It’s a fucking insult to her!’”).  It is somewhat of a 
paradox that precisely their social gender role differentiation leads to terminological parity: they are 
each other’s spouses.  By contrast, Roberta Kaplan, Windsor’s lawyer, insisted on being introduced 
as a speaker at the Association of American Law Schools annual meeting in 2014 as “Mrs.,” not 
“Ms.,” Kaplan.   
38 Literally in Obergefell’s case, his spouse being too sick even to disembark from the plane, 
whereas Thea Speyer, with the help of friends and special equipment, made it off the plane into 
Toronto just long enough to exchange vows.  See id. 




with special arrangements made to transport the sick spouse to a jurisdiction that 
offered same-sex marriage just long enough to exchange vows and drink a toast 
before returning to their home state, shortly thereafter to die. 
This puts Windsor and Obergefell as plaintiffs in a direct line of descent 
from the successful litigants in early gay rights victories such as Braschi v. Stahl 
Associates Co.39 and In re Guardianship of Kowalski.40  In none of these cases 
was the couple still functioning as a sexual couple at the time of litigation.41  Like 
Windsor and Obergefell’s spouses, “Braschi's lover [wa]s dead, [and] Kowalski 
had emerged from a coma severely impaired.”42  In all of these cases, the 
hallmark of the couple’s relationship was the long-term care of one for the other 
in sickness.  Like Braschi, Windsor and Obergefell can be assimilated to the 
traditionally favored class of widows.   
Another set of plaintiffs before the Court, those in the Michigan 
same-sex marriage case, belongs to a different class conceptually distanced from 
sexuality—they are adoptive mothers.43  Indeed, a noteworthy feature of the 
Michigan case is that the plaintiff couple, April De Boer and Jayne Rowse, both 
nurses and licensed foster parents, initially filed suit, not in order to marry, but in 
                                                                                                                                    
 
39 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that, where rent control 
laws prevent dispossession by a landlord of family members of a deceased tenant who lived in a 
controlled apartment with the tenant, “a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose 
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and 
interdependence” so that Braschi was entitled to succession rights in the apartment he had shared 
with his lover for ten years before the latter’s death). 
40 In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).  After Sharon 
Kowalski was severely injured in an auto accident in 1983, Karen Thompson, the lover with whom 
she had been “living together as a couple for four years,” waged a protracted court battle for 
guardianship against Kowalski’s parents, who were unaware of their daughter’s lesbian relationship 
before the accident and sought to bar Thompson from contact with their daughter, expressing a fear 
that she might sexually molest her.  Id. at 791.  The parents won the first several rounds of 
litigation, in opinions that described the two women as “roommates” and their relationship as 
“uncertain.”   In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).  In the 
final decision, the court awarded guardianship of Kowalski to Thompson, whom it described as 
“her lesbian partner,” finding such guardianship consistent with Kowalski’s wishes and in her best 
interests.  Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791.  The decision paved the way for Thompson to bring 
Kowalski home from the hospital into a “fully handicap-accessible [sic] home she had built in the 
hope that Sharon will be able to live there.”  Id. at 794.  See also KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE 
ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN’T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? passim (1988) (telling Thompson’s 
side of the story). 
41 Marriage is also distanced, at least temporally, from sexuality in the case of the Tennessee 
plaintiff couple discussed in Obergefell, who, the Court notes, chose to marry just before one of 
them was deployed to Afghanistan “for almost a year.”  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595.  
42 Case, supra note 26, at 1650. 
43 When a mother’s sexuality is highlighted in litigation, this tends to bode ill for her success.  
Thus, for example, in the infamous lesbian custody case, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410 (1995), 
Sharon Bottoms lost custody of her son to her own mother in part because, unlike her mother, she 
was unwilling to abandon her sexual partner so as prioritize what the court saw as a healthy 
environment for her son.   




order both to be recognized as the adoptive parents of the children only one of 
the partners had been allowed to adopt under Michigan law.   
To focus on the parental activities of a same-sex couple, as Kennedy 
does in both Windsor44 and Obergefell,45 is precisely not to focus on their sexual 
activities, because it is a central given that their sexual activity played no role in 
their becoming parents.  
It is the dissenters in these cases who mention sexual activity, in a way 
that is both focused on procreation and not particularly affirmative or attractive.  
Thus, for example, Chief Justice Roberts asserts that “[p]rocreation occurs 
through sexual relations between a man and a woman”46 and that “Noah Webster 
defined marriage as ‘the legal union of a man and woman for life,’ which served 
the purposes of ‘preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes.’”47  
Although there are occasional mentions of “romantic love”48 in the opinions, of 
the joy of sex there is scarcely a trace.  This seems to me a sad and dangerous 
loss.  Although Kennedy may have been right in Lawrence to claim that “it 
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the 
right to have sexual intercourse,” it should be seen as equally demeaning to both 
sex and a married couple to ignore that marriage is about sex.  There is a reason 
the same Book of Common Prayer marriage service from which the more 
familiar vows “in sickness and in health” are taken also included the vow “with 
my body I thee worship;”49 just as there is a reason why gay rights advocates 
since the 1970s insisted, “[n]ever forget one thing: What this movement is about 
is fucking.”50 
This was something Edie Windsor herself never forgot.  Although 
instructed by her lawyer Roberta Kaplan, “not to talk publicly about sex,”51 
                                                                                                                                    
 
44 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of children now 
being raised by same-sex couples.  The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children 
to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in 
their community and in their daily lives.”). 
45 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“[H]undreds of thousands of children are presently 
being raised by such couples . . . Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage 
offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”). 
46 Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  It is worth highlighting that, given the context of the new 
reproductive technologies, and especially their use by same-sex couples, Roberts’s description of 
how procreation occurs is terribly underinclusive. 
47 Id. at 2614, 2627 (“The law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachments and living 
arrangements it wishes.”). 
48 Id. at 2614 (“Arranged marriages have largely given way to pairings based on romantic love.”). 
49 See, e.g., The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony, in THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER – 1559, 
available at http://justus.anglican.org/resources/bcp/1559/Marriage_1559.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2015). 
50 DUDLEY CLENDINNEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 466 (Simon & Schuster, 1999) (former Advocate publisher David 
Goodstein citing Jim Foster). 
51 Levy, supra note 37 (“Until we’ve won, you have to stop talking about you and Thea as 
passionate butch-femme lovers.”).  See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE 
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE passim (2015).  




Windsor made clear in her public statements both before and after the case how 
very important good sex was to her marriage.  “I never wanted anybody inside 
me till Thea.  And then I wanted her inside me all the time,” she told the New 
Yorker.52  “Keep it hot” is her constant advice to fans who ask “the secrets to a 
long marriage.”53  And in the documentary Edie and Thea: A Very Long 
Engagement, made before Speyer’s death, she reveals just how they kept it hot, 
incorporating the paralyzed Speyer’s wheelchair into their dance routines and the 
apparatus used to hoist her into bed into their lovemaking.   
The triumph of same-sex marriage in the courts, is, however, not the 
triumph of this explicitly sex positive vision, but perhaps of what was called the 
homophile movement.  It is the long-delayed triumph of the first same sex 
marriage claimant before the Supreme Court, Jack Baker,54 who objected that the 
term “homosexual implies strictly sexual activity,”55 and wanted the laws 
protecting gays against discrimination to speak in terms of “affectional 
preference.”  
 
II.  MISSING TALK OF SEX EQUALITY 
 
In addition to the substantive due process route it seems to have taken, 
the Court in Obergefell easily could have held that a state ban on same-sex 
marriage violated equal protection guarantees because it lacked a rational 
relationship to a permissible governmental interest; because it discriminated with 
respect to the fundamental right to marry and on the basis of sex, and because it 
had an impermissible disparate impact on the basis of sexual orientation.  
Precisely given how many well-nigh inescapable routes to same-sex marriage 
there are under existing settled constitutional doctrine, it is particularly disturbing 
for Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion to end with the ringing declaration 
that “the Constitution . . . had nothing to do with” the Court’s decision 
“expanding same-sex marriage,”56 especially since his opinion does not in any 
serious way engage with the equal protection claims for same sex marriage, 
saying nothing about heightened scrutiny, only that “the marriage laws at issue 
                                                                                                                                    
 
52 Levy, supra note 37. 
53 Id. 
54 His case, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question, was explicitly overruled by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604, after having previously 
presented, for some lower court judges, an obstacle to recognizing a federal constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage.  For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 2004 
Lockhart Lecture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005) [hereinafter Case, Marriage Licenses]. 
55 See Lars Bjornson, Baker Rejects “Homosexual” in Gay Rights Amendment, ADVOCATE, May 
23, 1973, at 6.  Said Baker, “I consider that word insulting, equivalent to and on a par with the 
word ‘cocksucker.’”  An early adopter of the language of dignity in connection with gay rights, 
Baker insisted, “We have a right to expect our government to provide solutions to our problems in a 
manner that does not deprive us of our dignity as persons.”  See Case, Marriage Licenses, supra 
note 54, at 1790, for further discussion.  
56 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 




here do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinguishing between 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ ‘legitimate 
state interest’ in ‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage.’”57   
For Roberts, joined by Scalia and Thomas, to make the claim that the 
Constitution has “nothing to do” with the result in Obergefell could be a dark 
warning about the extent to which the dissenting justices see our current 
constitutional law of equal protection regardless of sex and of constitutional 
protection for intimate association58 as illegitimate, stare decisis notwithstanding.  
My own greatest fear is for the fragility, in the absence of a ratified Equal Rights 
Amendment, of what can be called the Ruth Bader Ginsburg revolution in 
constitutional sex discrimination law, i.e. the consistent line of cases extending 
from Reed v. Reed59 and Frontiero v. Richardson60 (which she respectively 
briefed and argued for the ACLU) through United States v. Virginia61 (which she 
wrote for the Court).62  Although this line of cases was affirmed as constitutional 
orthodoxy by no less than Chief Justice Rehnquist in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs,63 none of the dissenters in Obergefell has ever, as far 
as I can tell, voted in favor of a constitutional sex discrimination claim,64 and 
                                                                                                                                    
 
57 Id. at 2623 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ((quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment)).  Even Roberts’s conclusions on rational basis are difficult to sustain if 
Lawrence is seen as good law.  In his Lawrence dissent, Scalia correctly describes as a mere 
“conclusory statement that ‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is a legitimate state 
interest,” noting that “preserving the traditional institution of marriage is just a kinder way of 
describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.  Texas’s interest in [criminalizing 
homosexual sex] could be recast in similarly euphemistic terms: ‘preserving the traditional sexual 
mores of our society.’”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58 Recall that in the Justice Department in which Roberts served, saying one agreed with Griswold 
made one an unacceptable squish. 
59 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
60 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
61 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
62 For an extended explication of the parameters of this case law, see generally Mary Anne Case, 
“The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns:” Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for 
Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000) [hereinafter Case, The Very Stereotype the Law 
Condemns]; for an explanation of its relevance to the same-sex marriage cases, see generally Case,  
What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 7. 
63 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (upholding Congress’s Section V power to apply the Family and 
Medical Leave Act to the states because of the need to overcome “[s]tereotypes about women’s 
domestic roles . . . reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities 
for men”). 
64 Chief Justice Roberts did, in his confirmation hearings, express a commitment to heightened 
scrutiny for sex distinctions, but in a way that, although not as slippery as Justice Alito’s 
concessions in Hobby Lobby, does not quite commit him to upholding, let alone extending, the 
current settled law of constitutional sex discrimination.  Asked by then-Senator Biden: 
Do you think that if a state law distinguishes between a right that your daughter 
may have and your son may have, or your wife may have, or your sister may 
have and your brother may have, that the Supreme Court should engage in 
heightened scrutiny, not just look and see whether or not it makes any sense, 
but take an extra special look?  You and I know the terms, but the public 
listening here, the Supreme Court has said since 1971, you know, when a state 




Justice Kennedy’s allegiance to this line of cases is somewhat questionable.65  I 
shall therefore devote the remainder of this essay to a discussion of the 
implications of the absence in the same-sex marriage cases of an affirmation by 
all members of Court of the constitutional prohibition on sex discrimination in 
the laws of marriage. 
A premise that seems to unite all the justices who write opinions in 
Obergefell is that the long history of marriage is relevant if not determinative.  
Noting that “the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations,” 
Kennedy cites Confucius and Cicero and alludes to “religious and philosophical 
texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths,” insisting “[t]hat history is the beginning 
of these cases.”66  He might, however, have taken a lesson from his own approach 
to earlier constitutional cases concerning same-sex intimacy.  Bowers v. 
Hardwick had stressed the long history and wide geographical dispersion of 
prohibitions on same-sex coupling.67  But, in his own majority opinion in 
Lawrence, Kennedy downplayed both the accuracy and the relevance of the 
claim in Bowers that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct 
have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western 
civilization,” holding: “our laws and traditions in the past half century are of 
most relevance here.  These references show an emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”68 
Precisely that same past half-century had completely transformed the law of 
marriage in the United States from what existed in preceding millennia.  A 
crucial feature of that transformation, and its relation to the continuing exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marriage, was summed up well by Judge Vaughan 
                                                                                                                                    
passes a law that treats in any way a woman different than a man, there may be 
a rational for it, but the Supreme Court’s going to take a very close look.  Not 
strict scrutiny, which means you can hardly ever get over that bar, like race, but 
going to take a heightened—they’re going to look at it more closely.  Do you 
think that that needs to be done, the Constitution calls for that?   
Roberts responded, “Yes, Senator, I do.  And I, again, always have.”  Transcript: Day 
Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearing, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300979.html.  I am grateful to my colleague 
Will Baude for drawing this passage to my attention. 
65 Kennedy dissented in Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), for example, and wrote 
the opinion cabining the sex discrimination cases in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), in which 
he attempted to define the legally significant term “stereotype . . . as a frame of mind resulting from 
irrational or uncritical analysis,” although in previous cases it had been used to refer to any 
imperfect proxy, even one for which there was substantial empirical support.  See generally Case, 
The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns, supra note 62, for further discussion.  
66 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
67 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (“Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.”).  See also id. 
at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in 
Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.  Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under 
Roman law.”).   
68 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-2.  




Walker in his opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, striking down California’s 
Proposition 8:69 
 
The marital bargain in [the states] traditionally required that a woman's 
legal and economic identity be subsumed by her husband’s upon 
marriage under the doctrine of coverture. . . . As states moved to 
recognize the equality of the sexes, they eliminated laws and practices 
like coverture that had made gender a proxy for a spouse's role within a 
marriage. . . . Marriage was thus transformed from a male-dominated 
institution into an institution recognizing men and women as equals, . . 
. [T]he exclusion [of same-sex couples from marriage] exists as an 
artifact of a time when the genders were seen as having distinct roles in 
society and in marriage.  That time has passed. . . . Gender no longer 
forms an essential part of marriage; marriage under law is a union of 
equals.70 
 
Kennedy, too, tells the history of the move away from coverture and legally 
imposed role differentiation in marriage,71 but only as evidence that marriage has 
                                                                                                                                    
 
69 Walker was neither the first nor the last judge to recognize the close logical and historical 
connection between the constitutional revolution abolishing female subordination and fixed sex 
roles in marriage and claims for same-sex marriage.  For example, in the very first case to result in 
state recognition for same-sex couples, Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194 (1999), Justice Denise 
Johnson, concurring and dissenting, insisted that “[v]iewing the discrimination [in the marriage 
laws] as sex-based . . . is important” because “the sex-based classification contained in the marriage 
laws is unrelated to any valid purpose, but rather is a vestige of sex-role stereotyping that applies to 
both men and women” and “the State may [not] maintain a classification today only by giving 
credence to generally discredited sex-role stereotyping.” Id. at 254.  For further discussion see 
Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 7, at 1226.  Fifteen years after Baker, citing both 
Judge Walker and Justice Johnson, Ninth Circuit Judge Marsha Berzon, concurring in Latta v. 
Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), condemned “the sex-based classification contained in the[se] 
marriage laws” because “as the only gender classification that persists in some states' marriage 
statutes, [it] is, at best, ‘a vestige of sex-role stereotyping’ that long plagued marital regimes before 
the modern era and, at worst, an attempt to reintroduce gender roles.”  Id. at 490 (citations omitted).  
According to Berzon, “same-sex marriage bars constitute gender discrimination both facially and 
when recognized, in their historical context, both as resting on sex stereotyping and as a vestige of 
the sex-based legal rules once imbedded in the institution of marriage.”  Id.  They cannot withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, according to her, in part because “interests in promoting and enforcing 
gender stereotyping . . . simply are not legitimate governmental interests.”  Id.  
70 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-3 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  Because Judge Walker 
frames this passage as part of his findings of fact, rather than as the conclusion of constitutional law 
it actually is, he leaves himself open to Justice Alito’s derisive dismissal in his Windsor dissent.  
There, Justice Alito cites Walker’s Perry opinion to highlight “the degree to which this question [as 
to whether the Constitution codifies a particular view of marriage] is intractable to typical judicial 
processes of decisionmaking.”  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2719 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
71 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (citations omitted).  
As the role and status of women changed, the institution further evolved.  
Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were 
treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity. . . . As women 




evolved over time; he fails to link it tightly to the claim for same-sex marriage or 
to constitutional rights.  Instead of highlighting the active and definitive role of 
the Constitution and the Supreme Court in making the law of marriage 
throughout the United States egalitarian with respect to sex, Kennedy uses the 
passive voice: “As women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as 
society began to understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of 
coverture was abandoned.”72  Even when Kennedy centers on the period “in the 
1970s and 1980s” during which “[r]esponding to a new awareness, the Court 
invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based 
inequality on marriage” and then includes a string cite to half a dozen 
constitutional sex discrimination cases involving married couples, he does so 
only by way of providing one example among many that “the Court has 
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified 
inequality within our most fundamental institutions,”73 again failing to draw the 
more direct connection to same-sex marriage claims. 
Had Kennedy more clearly stressed the extraordinary constitutionally 
mandated nature of changes in the law of marriage resulting from the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional sex discrimination cases in the 1970s and 1980s, he would 
have directly refuted the claim of dissenting Chief Justice Roberts that “our 
Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage”74 and the claim of 
dissenting Justice Scalia that “[t]he law can recognize as marriage whatever 
sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes.”75  In an unbroken line of 
cases over nearly half a century, the Supreme Court has indeed entrenched one 
theory of marriage under our Constitution, a theory that excludes both legally 
enforced female subordination and legally enforced “fixed notions concerning 
the roles and abilities of males and females.”76  The law can no longer require a 
woman to give up her own legal identity as a condition of having the law 
recognize her marriage.  Thus, Blackstone’s “conception of marriage and 
family,” cited with approval in Chief Justice Roberts dissent, may have been, as 
Roberts claims, “a given” for the Framers, “its structure, its stability, roles, and 
                                                                                                                                    
gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to understand 
that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned. 
. . . These and other developments in the institution of marriage over the past 
centuries were not mere superficial changes.  Rather, they worked deep 
transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by 
many as essential. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 2603-4.  It is perhaps Kennedy’s focus in this paragraph on the Court’s use of “equal 
protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage,” rather than on 
the use of those principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based role differentiation in marriage, 
that inhibits him from drawing the more direct connection to same-sex marriage.  If, however, all 
legally mandated inequality in marriage is indeed “unjustified inequality,” so, too, all “sex-based 
classifications in marriage” are “invidious sex-based classifications.”  As used in this paragraph 
both negative adjectives should be read as descriptive, not limiting. 
74 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
76 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 




values accepted by all;”77 it is, however, the antithesis of a given under our 
current constitutional order; it is now unconstitutional. 
It remains, to me, frighteningly unclear whether any of the Obergefell 
dissenters accepts our constitutional commitment to an egalitarian, 
non-sex-role-differentiated law of marriage as settled constitutional law.  Their 
own views of the law of marriage seem stuck in a more distant, now repudiated 
past.  I could take comfort that the dissenters do not reject the sex discrimination 
argument outright, for example by holding, as some state judges did, that laws of 
equal application simply do not discriminate on the basis of sex.78  I fear, 
however, something far more sinister may be going on—these may be justices 
who have never accepted and still do not accept the settled law of sex 
discrimination.  To the extent they are serious about originalism, they believe the 
Constitution has no more to say about discrimination on grounds of sex in 
marriage (despite decades of cases all holding the contrary, beginning with 
Frontiero) than they claim it says about sexual orientation.  None of the 
dissenters while on the Supreme Court has voted in favor of a constitutional sex 
discrimination claim or as far as I can tell explicitly accepted the Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg revolution as a matter of stare decisis.  Scalia has all too recently very 
clearly disavowed the proposition that the Constitution “prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of sex.”79  
Roberts accuses the Obergefell majority of having “enacted their own 
vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.”80  But that was long since 
done by the Burger Court and ratified by the Rehnquist Court.  Roberts says he 
“would not ‘sweep away what has so long been settled’ without showing greater 
respect for all that preceded us.”81  But it is he who is disrespecting precedent.  
Roberts insisted in his confirmation hearings:  
 
In foreign law you can find anything you want.  If you don’t find it in the 
decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or 
Indonesia or wherever.  As somebody said in another context, looking at foreign 
law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends.  
You can find them, they’re there.  And that actually expands the discretion of 
                                                                                                                                    
 
77 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
78 See Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 7, for further discussion. 
79 See, e.g., The Originalist: Justice Antonin Scalia, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=913358 (answering interviewer Calvin Massey’s 
question whether “equal protection applied to sex discrimination” by saying, “[c]ertainly the 
Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of sex.  The only issue is whether it 
prohibits it.  It doesn’t.  Nobody ever thought that that’s what it meant.  Nobody ever voted for 
that.”).  For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, The Ladies?  Forget About Them.  A Feminist 
Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29 CONST. COMMENT 431, 447 (2014) [hereinafter Case, 
The Ladies]. 
80 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2610 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
81 Id. (citation omitted). 




the judge.  It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal 
preferences, cloak them with the authority of precedent.82 
 
But, in his Obergefell dissent, he invokes a very odd set of foreign friends, 
claiming the majority has “order[ed] the transformation of a social institution that 
has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen 
and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs.  Just who do we think we 
are?”83  As my colleague Richard Posner aptly responded, “We’re pretty sure 
we’re not any of the above.”84 
The discourse in the Obergefell opinions is the bright side of that in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, substituting the eternal glory of marriage for the eternal 
ignominy of homosexuality, bringing gays and lesbians within the marital fold as 
civilizational.  Bowers stressed that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have 
ancient roots.”85  Yet the same ancient roots that condemned homosexuality 
structured marriage so as to keep women down.  It is this inegalitarian, 
role-differentiated view of marriage that originalists in general and the Obergefell 
dissenters in particular must acknowledge as “the historic definition” which, 
according to Roberts, “[t]he people of a State are free . . . to retain.”86  Is it then, 
in the Obergefell dissenters’ eyes, only democratic will and legislative grace, not 
constitutional mandate, that prevents the reintroduction of coverture?  This is 
certainly the suggestion when the Roberts dissent, after insisting that the 
“Constitution itself says nothing about marriage, and the Framers thereby 
entrusted the States with ‘[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of 
husband and wife,’” observes that “the States have replaced coverture, the 
doctrine by which a married man and woman became a single legal entity, with 
laws that respect each participant’s separate status,”87 without  mentioning that 
                                                                                                                                    
 
82 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200, 200-01 (2005). 
83 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Commentators have puzzled over 
Roberts’s choice of examples.  See, e.g., Rosemary Joyce, Aztec Marriage: A Lesson for Chief 
Justice Roberts, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 26, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/what-
makes-us-human/201506/aztec-marriage-lesson-chief-justice-roberts (noting that the Aztecs were 
polygamous and, more generally, that “Roberts could hardly have picked a more challenging set of 
societies to support his claim that marriage is, and has been for millennia, a stable basis for social 
organization”).  Perhaps the most promising explanation for his choices I can think of is that each 
of the named societies was reported to tolerate homosexuality outside of marriage.  In any event, 
the Kalahari Bushmen, introduced at oral argument by Justice Kennedy, see Transcript of Oral 
Argument pt.1 at 15, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), are outliers in 
Roberts’s catalogue, with their relatively fluid marriage forms sympathetically described by a 
feminist anthropologist.  See generally MARJORIE SHOSTAK, NISA: THE LIFE AND WORDS OF A KUNG 
WOMAN passim (2000). 
84 Richard A. Posner, The Chief Justice’s Dissent Is Heartless, SLATE (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2015/scotus_roundup
/supreme_court_gay_marriage_john_roberts_dissent_in_obergefell_is_heartless.html. 
85 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986). 
86 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 




Supreme Court cases such as Kirchberg v. Feenstra88 put the states under federal 
constitutional compulsion to abolish coverture.89  Is the Bradley concurrence in 
Bradwell only contingently an anti-precedent?90  “[F]or those who believe in a 
government of laws, not of men, [sic]” it is the Obergefell dissenters’ approach, 
not that of the majority, which “is deeply disheartening.”91 
 
III. CONCLUSION: REMEMBERING THE SEX TALK OF 
ABIGAIL ADAMS 
 
Asserting originalist convictions, as he does often in his Obergefell 
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts insists:  
 
When it comes to determining the meaning of a vague constitutional 
provision—such as “due process of law” or “equal protection of the 
laws”—it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision 
did not understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal 
and uncontroversial in the years after ratification.92 
 
Roberts fails to acknowledge first that “the People who ratified that Provision” 
were all indeed “men” and second that among the practices they did not 
understand their guarantees of due process and equal protection to prohibit was 
the continued subordination of their wives to them through the law of marriage.93  
Instead of responding, as does Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, by 
highlighting the ways in which “changed understandings of marriage are 
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characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to 
new generations”94 let me conclude by turning instead to a member of the 
founding generation, Abigail Adams.  In one of a long series of passionate letters 
to her husband John, Abigail wrote, “Deliver me from your cold phlegmatick . . . 
Friends, Lovers and Husbands.  I thank Heaven I am not so constituted myself 
and so connected.”95  Equally passionately, but to no effect, Abigail famously 
wrote John:  
 
[I]n the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make 
I desire you to Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to 
them than your ancestors.  Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the 
Husbands.  Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could.  If p[a]rticular 
care and attention is not paid to the Ladies we are determined to foment a 
Rebel[l]ion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have 
no voice, or Representation.96 
 
Though John Adams was to scoff at her demands,97 she reminded him and all 
other men that “such of you as wish to be happy willingly give up the harsh title 
of Master for the more tender and endearing one of Friend.”98  Thus, 
“remember[ing] the Ladies,” as Abigail Adams advised, helps us also to 
remember what the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage opinions seem to have 
forgotten—both the joy of sex and the joy of the equality of the sexes.  
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